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62 ST. LoUIS LAW REVIEW
Following is an extract from the opinion given by Graves J. ". If a
property is of practically no value, and parties interested therein have know-
ledge of the fact that another is claiming title to the property, then, if the
party claiming the title proceeds to take his chance, expend his money and his
work upon such property, with the knowledge of the other parties, and by
virtue of his acts the property suddenly becomes valuable, laches can be properly
invoked, on the theory that the property only had a speculative value, which was
suddenly placed in the category of real, or great value, by the money and work
of the adverse claimant ........
HOMESTEAD.-WHEN IT MAY BE SOLD FOR PAYMENT OF DEBTS.
A question of much difficulty to purchasers of property and title examiners
had arisen because of the Missouri Homestead statute. The courts construed
the homestead exemption liberally in favor of the owner, his wife and children
and against creditors, and in consequence the title to property which has pre-
viously been subjected to the homestead claim is involved in much doubt. The
courts therefore set aside any sale by order of the probate court to satisfy
creditors claims out of the honetead unless the provisions of the statute have
been strictly complied with and the rights of the parties enjoying the home-
stead exemption fully relinquished.
The Homestead Act of 1895, and as amended in 1907, provides that when
a decedent dies, title to the homestead real estate becomes vested in his heirs,
subject to the enjoyment of the homestead by his widow and children, free
from the payment of debts not legally charged thereon in the decedents life
time or those created subsequently to the acquisition of the homestead, until the
children attain their majority, and until the death or remarriage of the widow.
In the late case of Dennis v. Gorman, 233 S. W. 50, in the Missouri Supreme
Court, it was held that where the homestead was sold by order of the probate
court for debts not charged thereon during the decedent's lifetime, that there
being no jurisdiction of the subject matter, the sale was absolutely void and
subject to collateral attack. It was also held that inasmuch as the remainder
in fee passed to the heirs of the deceased husband, it was not necessary for the
continuation of the homestead that the children entitled thereto should remain
in possession. To the same effect was the holding in In Re Boward's Estate,
231 S. W. 600.
The fact that the children who enjoy the homestead exemption doring
minority also have the remainder in fee (together with the other heirs of the
decedent) makes their intcrest in many cases equivalent to a fee simple estate.
The statute further provides that the homestead property cannot be sold for
debts unless the heirs holding the remainder are persons other than the deced-
ent's children. So where the heirs of the deceased householder are his own
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children or decendants (and not collateral heirs) and the same children enjoy
the homestead during minority, it has been held that their homestead right
amo ants to an absolute exemption, forever free from sale for the payment of
debts; Armour Y. Lewis, 252 Mo. 568, and cases in accord. In this state
from 1865 to 1875. the statute gave the widow a homestead in fee simple, simi-
iar to the result in some cases under, the statute today. It will be seen that
the title of any person claiming through a purchaser at a sale of homestead
property for the payment of debts, eve though it be by order of the probate
court, is very doubtful and should be accepted with caution.
INSURANCE-LIABILITY OF INSURANCE COMPANY FOR SLAN-
DER OF ITS AGENT.
In the case of Vowles v. Yakisk 179 N W 117 (Iowa) plaintiff's grocery
store was destroyed by fire, and agent of defendant insurance company
%hile adjusting the loss, asserted in te presence of witnesses that plaintiff had
bulned the building. In an action for slander against the Insurance company,
the court says that the r.4 question of the case is not whether the company
had expressly authorized se words spoken, but rather, whether the agent at
the time he uttered the words complained of was acting within the scope of
his authority and in the actual performance of his duties touching the subject-
matter of the transaction. The mere fact that the agent was acting in that
capacity at the time the words were spoken would not fasten liability on the
company, unless the test of the scope of his employment was satisfied. The
court found that the agent at the time he spoke the words in question was act-
ing beyond his authority, as it was not his duty to inquire into the origin
of the fire, and therefore the company could not be liable for his words unless
a subsequent ratification could be proved, and further that- an acceptance of the
agent's settlement did not amount to a ratification where the sole question ne-
gotiated in making the settlement was the amount of loss sustained and not the
origin of the fire. A verdict of five thousand dollars damages in the trial
c urt was reversed and the case remanded.
But the dissenting opinion of Weaver, C. J. seems to rest more upon the
weight of authority and the better reasoning. He is inclined to view the con-
clusion, of the.court as an umecessary refinement upon the laws of master and
servant, and holds that the slanderous remarks of the agent can hardly be dis-
sociated from his official employment and that the company should be held
liable for such remarks where the agent was acting in its behalf at the time the
remarks were made. He cites a number of authorities which seem to be well
considered opinions of respectable courts as sustaining his conclusions, Fensky
v. Maryland Casualty Co., 264 Mo. 154. Nesbit v. C. R. L & P. R. R. Co., 163
Ia. 39. Palmeri v. Railroad Co., 133 N. Y. 261. A complete review of this
question will be found in a note in 13 A. L R., 1142.
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